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CREATING MISCHIEF: THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
DECLARES THE SEC’S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGES UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN BANDIMERE V. 
SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Casey M. Olesen*
ABSTRACT
Since the passage of the APA, administrative agencies’ use of Administrative 
Law Judges (ALJs) to preside over hearings has exploded, and now far outpaces the 
number trials conducted before federal judges.  The Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) is one such agency that heavily utilizes ALJs to conduct their 
hearings.  Recently, following an apparent higher percentage of SEC wins before 
their own ALJs as compared to before federal judges, a new constitutional challenge 
on the basis of the Appointments Clause has been brought before several circuits; 
that the SEC’s ALJs are inferior officers of the SEC, not employees, and therefore 
are required to be appointed pursuant to the requirements of the Appointments 
Clause.  The support for this challenge comes from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Freytag v. Commissioner, which laid out three indicia of inferior officer status.  In 
2016, both the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit had occasion to decide this issue, 
with the former ruling in favor of the SEC’s ALJs, and the latter against.  The circuit 
split has left the status of the SEC’s ALJs in a state of flux, with more challenges 
certain to come, including challenges to other agencies’ ALJs.  This Note argues that 
the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Bandimere v. SEC more faithfully applied the 
Supreme Court’s indicia of officer status, and properly declared the SEC’s ALJs 
inferior officers.
I. INTRODUCTION
“Today the Federal Government has a corps of administrative law judges numbering 
more than 1,000 whose principle statutory function is the conduct of adjudication 
under the Administrative Procedures Act.  They are all executive officers.”1
The modern Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) position was created by 
Congress in the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (“APA”), replacing the 
position previously known as “hearing examiners.”2 Prior to the APA, concerns 
often arose that hearing examiners could not truly exercise independent judgment 
                                                                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2018.  The Author would like to thank 
Professor Jeff Thaler for his many edits and comments over multiple drafts and for providing guidance in 
the writing of this Note.  The Author is also grateful to his editor, Ashley Perry, as well as his family for 
their continued support.
1 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 910 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
2 Classification & Qualifications, OFFICE PERS. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-
oversight/classification-qualifications/general-schedule-qualification-standards/specialty-
areas/administrative-law-judge-positions/ [https://perma.cc/B32Y-C5RX]; see also Ramspeck v. Fed. 
Trial Exam'rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 130 (1953).
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because they were subordinate to executive officers within the agency they served, 
and performed both prosecutorial and investigative work in addition to their judicial 
role.3 The APA attempted to remedy these concerns by adding protections 
guaranteeing the independence of ALJs.4
Since the passage of the APA, the use of ALJs and administrative hearings has 
exploded and now far outpaces the number of traditional trials within the United 
States.5 In fact, federal judges will decide roughly 95,000 adjudicatory proceedings 
in a year, including trials.6 But that number pales in comparison to the more than 
939,000 adjudicatory proceedings that are completed by federal administrative 
agencies in that same period.7 Under this system, the modern ALJ has powers that 
the Supreme Court has described as “functionally comparable” to those of an Article 
III judge.8 Commensurate with this power, ALJs have been granted immunity for 
actions taken in their judicial roles.9
As of 2016, the Federal Government employs over 1,770 ALJs.10 A sampling 
of agencies employing ALJs include the National Labor Relations Board (thirty-four 
ALJs), the United States Postal Service (one ALJ), the Department of Labor (forty-
one ALJs), and the Department of Health and Human Service’s Office of Medicare 
Hearings and Appeals (eighty ALJs).11 But of all agencies, the Social Security 
Administration employs by far the most at over 1,500.12 At interest here, however, 
are the ALJs utilized by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which presently 
employs five ALJs.13
In 2010, the authority granted to the SEC’s ALJs was expanded by the Dodd-
Frank Act, expanding the civil penalties available to ALJs, and extending their 
jurisdiction.14 Since the expansion, there has been a jump in the SEC’s use of 
administrative hearings rather than federal trials to adjudicate enforcement actions.15
                                                                                                     
3 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978).
4 Id. at 514.
5 Jonathon Turley, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, THE WASH. POST (May 
24, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-of-
government/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/TDE9-7GW7]; see also W. Michael Gillette, Administrative Law Judges, 
Judicial Independence, and Judicial Review: Qui Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?, 20 J. NAT’L 
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 95, 100 (2000) (noting that the Social Security Administration’s 
ALJs decided more cases in one year than all traditional court systems in the United States 
combined). 
6 Turley, supra note 5.
7 Id.
8 Butz, 438 U.S. at 513. 
9 Id. at 514.
10Office of Personnel Management, Administrative Law Judges, https://www.opm.gov/services-for-
agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency [https://perma.cc/DQ5M-RJVV] (number of 
ALJs current as of December 2016).
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 78u-2(a), 80a-9(d)(1), 80b-3(i)(1) (2012) (penalties available); 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78o, 78o-4, 78q-1, 78u-3, 80b-3 (2012) (jurisdiction).
15 Breon Peace et al., The Future of SEC Administrative Proceedings, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2017, 11:20 
AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/876875/the-future-of-sec-administrative-proceedings 
[https://perma.cc/3F2P-4JTA].
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Exemplifying this jump, the SEC brought only thirty-five percent of its enforcement 
actions as administrative hearings between 2010 and 2013, but in 2015 brought 
seventy-six percent.16 This is less surprising when noting that the SEC prevailed in 
sixty-one percent of cases brought in federal court, but one hundred percent of in-
house administrative hearings before its ALJs in 2014.17 Even further, it has been 
suggested by commentators that administrative proceeding procedural rules 
disadvantage those against whom enforcement actions are brought.18
This variation in outcome between the two forums has been brought to the 
public’s eye by large media outlets, compounding the view that administrative 
proceedings are inherently unfair to defendants.19 But it is important to note that 
critics have found at least one such study to be empirically unfounded.20 In a recent 
review, a commentator noted that “there is no robust correlation between the selected 
forum and case outcome.”21 However, this conclusion was caged by a statement that 
the “finding does not imply that the type of forum in which the SEC litigates does 
not matter.  Rather, there are significant empirical obstacles to finding any useful 
results by comparing case outcomes.”22
The apparent disparity, whether empirically founded or not, between the SEC’s 
win rates in federal trials versus in-house administrative proceedings lends itself to 
challenge in court.23 While many of these challenges focus on due process, equal 
protection, or the right to a trial,24 a new constitutional challenge has begun to 
emerge–that the SEC’s ALJs hold their positions in contravention to the 
Constitution.25 That challenge is based on the Appointments Clause, which requires 
that officers of the United States be appointed in a specific manner.26 The Seventh 
Circuit was the first federal appellate court to have this issue before it, but dismissed 
the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.27 However, in 2016, two separate 
Circuit Courts reached the merits of the Appointments Clause challenge to SEC 
                                                                                                     
16 Id.
17 Carmen Germaine, Circuits Split Widely On SEC Judges’ Constitutionality, LAW360 (Jan. 3, 2017, 
10:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/876758/circuits-split-widely-on-sec-judges-
constitutionality [https://perma.cc/YMD2-2MKD]. 
18 See William McLucas & Matthew Martens, How to Rein in the SEC, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-to-rein-in-the-sec-1433285747 [https://perma.cc/X2RZ-FCPX].
19 See e.g., Jean Eaglesham, SEC is Steering More Trials to Judges It Appoints, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-is-steering-more-trials-to-judges-it-appoints-1413849590
[https://perma.cc/F9U9-XYZY]; Gretchen Morgenson, At the SEC, a Question of Home-Court Edge, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/at-the-sec-a-question-of-home-
court-edge.html [https://perma.cc/L8EK-QLF3].
20 See, e.g., Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical 
Investigation, 92 WASH. L. REV. 315, 315 (2017) (asserting that “the evidence offered by the Wall Street 
Journal is deficient and its conclusions unfounded”). 
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 See David Zaring, Enforcement Discretion at the SEC, 94 TEX. L.R. 1155, 1157-59, 1158 n.10 
(2016) (citing cases where the constitutionality of SEC administrative proceedings has been challenged).
24 Id.
25 See, e.g., Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir. 2016); Bebo v. SEC, 799 F.3d 765, 768 (7th 
Cir. 2015).
26 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
27 Bebo, 799 F.3d at 768.
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ALJs, with a third dismissing the claim on jurisdictional grounds.28 In the circuits 
that reached the merits, the losing parties filed for rehearing en banc—both were 
denied.29
This Note considers the question of whether or not SEC ALJs are inferior 
officers subject to the Appointments Clause, arguing for an affirmative answer to 
that question through an interpretation of the most applicable Supreme Court 
precedent, Freytag v. Commissioner.  This question is presented through the lens of 
the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Bandimere v. SEC, where a divided panel 
decided that the SEC’s ALJs were inferior officers requiring constitutional 
appointment.30 An opposing view is offered in Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, where 
the D.C. Circuit held to the contrary.31
First, a brief overview of the factual and procedural background of Bandimere
is presented.  Next, the applicable legal framework is provided, including a general 
overview of the ALJ position, the Appointments Clause, and the Supreme Court’s 
precedent in Freytag.  The opposing views of the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit 
are then presented, followed by an analysis of why the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation 
of Freytag properly applies the Supreme Court’s precedent on the Appointments 
Clause, and better balances other considerations relevant to the discussion of the role 
of ALJs.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 6, 2012, the SEC issued an Order Instituting Administrative 
Proceedings against David F. Bandimere, alleging multiple violations of various 
antifraud and registration provisions established by multiple securities statutes and 
SEC rules.32 The allegations included operating as an unregistered broker and selling 
unregistered investments in Ponzi schemes, misleading investors by solely providing 
positive outlooks on investments, and failing to disclose any red flags or potentially 
negative facts about investments.33 Bandimere admitted that the companies were 
Ponzi schemes, but denied any further allegations, claiming that he was also a victim 
of the Ponzi schemes with an investment of $1.2 million dollars of his own money 
into the same companies.34
An administrative hearing was held from April 22 to April 26, 2013, and on May 
2, 2013.35 The hearing was presided over by one of the SEC’s ALJs.36 On October 
                                                                                                     
28 See Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding SEC ALJs to be 
employees), petition for cert. filed, No. 17-130 (U.S. July 26, 2017); Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 
1181 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding SEC ALJs to be inferior officers requiring appointment), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 17-475 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2017); Tilton, 824 F.3d at 281 (dismissing for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction).
29 Bandimere v. SEC, 855 F.3d 1128, 1128 (10th Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en banc); Raymond 
J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, No. 15-1345, 2017 WL 2727019, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 16, 2017) (per curiam) 
(denying rehearing en banc).
30 844 F.3d at 1181.
31 832 F.3d at 289.
32 David F. Bandimere, SEC Release No. 507, 2013 WL 5553898, *1 (Oct. 8, 2013).
33 Id.
34 Id. at *2.
35 Id. at *1.
36 Id.
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8, 2013, the ALJ issued an initial decision, concluding that Bandimere committed 
the myriad of violations alleged against him.37 The ALJ imposed civil penalties of 
$390,000, ordered disgorgement of $638,056.33 plus prejudgment interest, and 
barred Bandimere from the securities industry.38
Bandimere appealed this decision, seeking review of the ALJ’s decision by the 
Commission.39 Bandimere advanced multiple arguments to the Commission, 
including an arbitrary and capricious denial of an evidence production request 
against the SEC, an Equal Protection Clause claim, and most importantly, an 
Appointments Clause claim.40 The SEC upheld the ALJ's denial of Bandimere’s 
request for evidence production and rejected his Equal Protection claim.41 These 
issues were not reached upon appeal.42 As for the Appointment’s Clause challenge, 
the SEC Commission conceded that the ALJ had not been properly appointed, but 
ultimately rejected the challenge.43 The SEC defended this result by viewing its 
ALJs not as officers requiring appointment, but as mere employees.44
The SEC Commission ultimately found Bandimere liable, issuing a separate 
final opinion instituting the same penalties imposed by the ALJ.45 Following the 
SEC Commission’s final order, Bandimere appealed to the Tenth Circuit, once again 
raising an Appointments Clause challenge.46
III. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 
The administrative law judge position “is not a creature of administrative law; 
rather it is a direct creation of Congress . . . .”47 The position’s duties and functions 
are set forth within the APA, which allows for ALJs to preside over the taking of 
evidence at an administrative hearing.48 An administrative agency may “appoint as 
many administrative law judges as are necessary for proceedings” conducted 
pursuant to the APA.49
All ALJs are hired through a merit-selection process administered by the Office 
of Personnel Management (“OPM”).50 Aspiring ALJs must be licensed, active status 
attorneys or have judicial status, and are ranked according to an exam administered 
by the OPM.51 The SEC then hires from the top three ranked candidates.52 Once 
hired, an ALJ holds their position for the entirety of their career, and can only be 
fired by the United States Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”) for good 
                                                                                                     
37 Id.
38 Id. at *85-86.
39 David F. Bandimere, SEC Release No. 9972, 2015 WL 6575665, *1 (Oct. 29, 2015).
40 Id. at *17-23.
41 Id. at *17, *22-23.
42 See Bandimere v. SEC., 844 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2016).
43 David F. Bandimere, SEC Release No. 9972, 2015 WL 6575665, *19-21 (Oct. 29, 2015).
44 Id.
45 Id. at *32.
46 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1171.
47 Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 540 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986).
48 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (2012).
49 Id. § 3105.
50 Id. § 1302; 5 C.F.R. § 930.201 (2007).
51 5 C.F.R. §§ 930.204, 337.101.
52 Bandimere v. SEC., 844 F.3d 1168, 1176-77 (10th Cir. 2016).
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cause.53
Agencies are able to delegate certain authority to its ALJs.  For the SEC, 
statutory authority provides that “any of its functions” may be delegated to its ALJs 
with the exception of rulemaking.54 Utilizing that authority, the SEC has delegated 
the ability to “conduct hearings” and the “responsib[ility] for the fair and orderly 
conduct of the proceedings” to its ALJs, including the “authority to do all things 
necessary and appropriate to discharge [their] duties.”55 This includes the 
administration of oaths and affirmations; the determination of “scope and form of 
evidence”; the entering of default judgment; examination of witnesses; issuance of 
protective orders; issuance, modification, and revocation of subpoenas; ruling on all 
motions; ruling on evidentiary issues; and the preparation of initial factual findings, 
legal conclusions, and appropriate order.56
IV. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE
The Appointments Clause has been described by the Supreme Court as having 
been drafted with more than “etiquette or protocol [] describing ‘Officers of the 
United States,’” and the appointment process in mind.57 Instead, it “is among the 
significant structural safeguards of the constitutional scheme.”58 It its entirety, the 
Appointments Clause states:
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and consuls, Judges of 
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments 
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but 
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers as they 
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of 
Departments.59
This clause encompasses both structural and political principles.  First, it serves as a 
safeguard “against one branch’s aggrandizing its power at the expense of another 
branch,”60 while “preventing the diffusion of the appointment power.”61 Such 
protections “embod[y] both separation of powers and checks and balances.”62
Second, the Appointments Clause is “designed to ensure public accountability for 
both the making of a bad appointment and the rejection of a good one.”63 Thus, those 
                                                                                                     
53 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a), (b) (setting forth actions the MSPB can take against ALJS); 5 C.F.R. § 930.204 
(“An administrative law judge receives a career appointment . . . .”).  The Merit Systems Protection Board 
consists of three members appointed by the President, and removable only for good cause. 5 C.F.R. § 
1200.2 (1991).
54 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1(a) (2012).
55 17 C.F.R. §§ 200.14, 201.111 (2017).
56 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1178 (listing duties and corresponding statutes and regulations).
57 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam).
58 Edmond v. United States., 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997).
59 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
60 Freytag v. Comm’r., 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991).
61 Id.
62 Bandimere v. SEC., 844 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2016).
63 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 660 (quoting Hamilton as observing that “[t]he blame of a bad nomination 
would fall upon the president singly and absolutely,” while “[t]he censure of a good [nomination] would 
lie entirely at the door of the senate . . . .”).
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wielding constitutional appointment power are “accountable to political force and 
the will of the people.”64
Beyond those lofty principles, the Appointments Clause does, in fact, also 
describe the procedures required to be used in appointing two classes of officers, 
principal officers (“officers”) and inferior officers.  To satisfy the Appointments 
Clause, an officer of the United States must be nominated by the President, and 
confirmed by the Senate.65 This method of appointment is also considered the 
“default manner of appointment for inferior officers.”66 However, the Appointments 
Clause has an “Excepting Clause” allowing for Congress to confer the ability to 
appoint inferior officers to “the President alone, the Courts of Law, or the Heads of 
Departments.”67 This “very clearly divides . . . officers into two classes.”68
This distinction between classes of officers arose due to the foresight of the 
Framers, who realized that “when offices become numerous, and sudden removals 
necessary,” requiring the action of both the President and the Senate “might be 
inconvenient.”69 Therefore, the Constitution provides for Congress to delegate its 
constitutionally vested appointments power to the President, a court of law, or the 
head of a department.70
An officer of the United States has been simply described as “any appointee 
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States,” or “all 
persons who can be said to hold an office under the government . . . .”71 Inferior 
officers also exercise such authority, but are distinct from an officer in that "the term 
‘inferior officer’ connotes a relationship with some higher ranking officer or officers 
below the President . . . .”72 The Supreme Court has then helpfully stated that a 
determination of whether an officer is “inferior” rests on “whether he has a 
superior.”73
Beyond that extremely circular definition, the Supreme Court has described 
inferior officers in various other ways, including: those being charged with “the 
administration and enforcement of the public law,”74 persons being granted 
“significant authority,”75 those holding the “responsibility for conducting civil 
litigation in the courts of the United States,”76 and those that hold an office created 
by regulations or statutes.77
Over a span of more than 150 years, the Court has declined to state a specific 
                                                                                                     
64 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 884.
65 See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659-60; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878).
66 Id. at 660.
67 Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
68 Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam); Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510.
72 Edmond, 520 U.S. at 662.
73 Id.
74 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 139.
75 Id. at 126.
76 Id. at 140.
77 United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1888); see also Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 
U.S. 477, 539 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (summarizing the Supreme Court’s various definitions of 
inferior officers listed here).
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and conclusive definition of inferior officer status.78 Instead, the Court conducts a 
case-specific inquiry into the purported inferior officer.79 Over the years, positions 
including district court clerks,80 election monitors,81 federal marshals,82 military 
judges,83 and judges in Article I courts have been declared inferior officers.84
Inferior officers are not the lowest class of civil servants within the Federal 
Government—below them are employees.  An employee is considered “subordinate 
to officers of the United States,” as is an inferior officer.85 For employees, the 
Appointments Clause does not apply.86
While the distinction between inferior officers and employees has not been 
widely litigated, the distinction is just as important as that between principal and 
inferior officers.  It dictates how a civil servant may be hired or fired, who they 
answer to, and who stands accountable for their actions.  When this difference is 
applied to ALJs, questions of impartiality, accountability, and fairness in the 
administrative system arise.
V. FREYTAG AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The question whether the SEC’s ALJs are inferior officers or employees was 
first reached on the merits by a Circuit Court in August 2016, when the D.C. Circuit 
held that the SEC’s ALJs were employees, not inferior officers.87 Four months later, 
the merits were reached again when the Tenth Circuit held the opposite.88 A 1991 
Supreme Court case, Freytag v. Commissioner provided the precedent for each 
circuit’s opinion.89
In Freytag, the Court confronted whether the Tax Court had the authority to 
appoint Special Tax Judges (STJs), who could be assigned to hear four statutory 
categories of cases.90 For the first three of those categories, the STJs were able to 
hear, report, and decide the case on their own.91 For the fourth category, the STJ 
could hear the case and prepare proposed findings and opinions, but could not 
actually decide the case.92 Instead, a regular Tax Court judge—appointed by the 
President—needed to review the STJ’s proposed findings and opinion, and then 
                                                                                                     
78 See Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 539 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[E]fforts to define [inferior officer] 
inevitably conclude that the term’s sweep is unusually broad.”).
79 See, e.g., id. at 539-40 (listing the various ways that the Supreme Court has defined “inferior 
officer”).
80 In re Hennen, 38 U.S. 230, 258 (1839).
81 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-99 (1879).
82 Id. at 397.
83 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 170 (1994).
84 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991); see also Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 540 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (listing those the Supreme Court has held to be inferior officers).
85 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976).
86 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (only requiring appointment for officers and inferior officers).
87 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
88 Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168, 1188 (10th Cir. 2016).
89 501 U.S. at 892. See Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1173-76; Lucia, 832 F.3d at 284-86 (discussing 
Freytag, 501 U.S. 868).
90 Id. at 873.  The authority to appoint STJ to the cases was conferred under the then-applicable 26 
U.S.C. § 7443A(B). Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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render a binding decision.93 Freytag’s controversy arose under that fourth 
category.94
An STJ was assigned to the case, presided over the hearing, and issued a 
proposed opinion finding liability.95 That opinion was subsequently adopted by the 
Tax Court.96 On appeal, Freytag argued that the STJ was actually an inferior officer 
who had not been appointed in accordance with the requirements of the 
Appointments Clause.97 Specifically, Freytag contended that the Chief Judge of the 
Tax Court lacked the ability to appoint inferior officers, as the Chief Judge was 
neither the President, a department head, nor a court of law.98 The government 
sought to rebut that argument by claiming that STJs assigned under the fourth 
category of cases were not required to be appointed as they were employees of the 
Tax Court, not inferior officers.99 In an odd attempt at supporting their argument, 
the government conceded that STJs assigned to cases under the first three categories 
were in fact inferior officers, but argued that STJs assigned to the fourth category of 
cases could not be inferior officers because they lacked authority to issue final 
decisions.100
Most of the Freytag decision was not spent on distinguishing between inferior 
officers and employees, but rather focused on whether the Chief Judge had the 
authority to appoint inferior officers.101 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the Tax Court was in fact a court of law, and thus the Chief Judge wielded such 
authority.102 However, in the Court’s brief discussion of the distinguishing 
characteristics between employees and inferior officers, the Court set forth three 
indicia of inferior officer status: (1) the position was established by law; (2) the 
“duties, salary, and means of appointment for that [position were] specified by 
statute”; and (3) the position performed “more than ministerial tasks” in an “exercise 
[of] significant discretion.”103 Each of these indicia were answered in the affirmative 
as to the STJ position, leading to a conclusion that STJs were inferior officers.104
Moving on, the Court then stated that “[e]ven if the duties of [STJs] . . . were 
not as significant as [the Court] found them to be, [their] conclusion would be 
unchanged.”105 This contention seemed to be in response to the government’s 
argument that Freytag had no standing to assert the duties of STJs assigned under the 
first three categories.106 The Court dismissed this as “beside the point,” as STJs could 
not be “inferior officers for purposes of some of their duties . . . but mere employees 
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with respect to other responsibilities.”107 “The fact that an inferior officer on 
occasion performs duties that may be performed by an employee . . . does not 
transform his status under the Constitution.”108 As result, the Court held that STJs 
were inferior officers no matter what category of case was before them.109
VI. THE D.C. CIRCUIT
The basic facts in the Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC are similar to those in 
Bandimere.  As in Bandimere, the SEC charged multiple investment companies with 
misleading and deceptive advertising.110 The SEC instituted administrative actions, 
and a hearing was held before an SEC ALJ.111 The ALJ found liability, and the 
companies sought review by the SEC Commission who imposed the same 
sanctions.112 The companies appealed to the D.C. Circuit, who agreed with the SEC 
on the Appointments Clause challenge.113
The D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Lucia can be traced back to its interpretation of 
Freytag in an earlier case, Landry v. FDIC.114 There, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) ALJs were not inferior officers 
because they exercised no final decision-making authority.115 There, the D.C. Circuit 
ruled that the FDIC’s ALJs were not inferior officers because they exercised no final 
decision-making authority.116 Instead, the ALJs made recommendations to the FDIC 
Board of Directors, who could choose whether or not to accept the 
recommendation.117 Here, the D.C. Circuit first stated it’s view that the STJs’ 
authority to issue final decisions, at least in some cases, “was critical to the 
[Supreme] Court’s decision” in Freytag.118
In 2012, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed this interpretation in Tucker v. 
Commissioner.119 In Tucker, the D.C. Circuit was confronted with an Appointments 
Clause challenge to certain employees within the Internal Revenue Service’s Office 
of Appeals.120 Relying on Landry, the D.C Circuit stated that the “main criteria for 
drawing the line between inferior [o]fficers and employees not covered by the clause 
are (1) the significance of the matters resolved by the officials, (2) the discretion they 
exercise in reaching their decisions, and (3) the finality of those decisions.”121
Predictably, the D.C. Circuit continued to apply its interpretation of Freytag in 
2016 when it decided Lucia. As in Landry, the D.C. Circuit again stated that:
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[I]t understood that it “was critical to the [Supreme] Court’s decision” in Freytag
that the [STJ] had authority to issue final decisions in at least some cases, because
it would have been “unnecessary” for the Court to consider whether the tax judges 
had final decision-making power when the judge in Freytag’s case exercised no such 
power.122
With a lack of final decision-making power, the ALJ could not “be said to have been
delegated sovereign authority or to have the power to bind third parties, or the 
government itself.”123 Therefore, the exercise of final decision-making authority was 
determined to be the deciding factor in determining officer status.
In June 2017, a petition for rehearing of Lucia en banc was denied by an “equally 
divided” D.C. Circuit.124
VII. THE TENTH CIRCUIT
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the D.C. Circuit’s application of Freytag, with 
a concurring judge calling it a “truncated legal framework,”125 but a dissenting 
opinion agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s approach.126 The concurring judge 
wholeheartedly agreed with the majority, but wrote separately to repudiate the 
dissent’s arguments in greater detail.127 Ultimately, the existence of three different 
opinions provide for a deep scrutiny of the Appointments Clause issue, as well as 
clear statements of arguments both for and against classifying the SEC’s ALJs as 
inferior officers.
In applying Freytag, the majority spent very little time, and the dissent and 
concurrence spent none, responding to the application of the first two characteristics 
of the Supreme Court’s inferior officer test.  It was easily accepted that the SEC ALJ 
position was established by law—specifically the Administrative Procedures Act—
and there was no argument that the duties, salary, and means of appointment were 
also provided by the APA in conjunction with SEC rules.128 The final 
characteristic—the exercise of significant discretion—quickly became the 
centerpiece of the Tenth Circuit’s internal disagreement, as well as the delineating 
factor with the D.C. Circuit.129
A.  Significant Discretion and Final Decision-Making Authority
For the majority, the functions and duties of the ALJs were so closely 
“commensurate” with those of the STJs, that ALJs must be considered inferior 
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officers in the same vein.130 Specifically, the majority pointed to the ALJs’ 
“authority to shape the administrative record by taking testimony, regulating 
document production and depositions, ruling on the admissibility of evidence, ruling 
on dispositive and procedural motions, issuing subpoenas, and presiding over trial-
like hearings” where credibility determinations were afforded “considerable weight” 
during SEC review.131
The most significant factor came in the form of the ALJs’ ability to issue initial 
decisions that declare liability and impose sanctions.132 If a party does not seek 
timely review by the SEC, “the action of [the ALJ] shall, for all purposes, including 
appeal or review thereof, be deemed the action of the Commission.”133 But even if 
the party sought agency review, the SEC could decline the review in certain 
categories of cases, effectively rendering the ALJ decision final.134 Further, the ALJ 
could enter default judgment against parties, hold and require attendance at 
settlement conferences, and “set aside, make permanent, limit, or suspend temporary 
sanctions that the SEC itself has imposed.”135 Each of these powers exemplify what 
the majority viewed as significant authority and discretion.
In response, both the SEC and the dissent argued that the SEC’s ALJs could not 
possibly be inferior officers as they do not exercise final decision-making power.136
The SEC and dissent supported this contention with the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in 
Lucia, in particular that the Supreme Court “laid exceptional stress on the STJs’ final 
decision-making power,” and with lack of such authority an ALJ could not be an 
inferior officer.137 As the D.C. Circuit stated, the “analysis begins, and ends, 
there.”138
The majority and concurrence disagreed with relying on the D.C. Circuit’s 
precedent, believing it to be a “truncated framework” that “place[d] undue weight on 
final decision-making authority.”139 On the contrary, the majority believed that 
“properly read, Freytag did not place ‘exceptional stress’ on final decision-making 
power,”140 as the STJs were classified as inferior officers based on the significance 
of their duties and authority.141
The majority supported this view by reading Freytag’s “even if” argument as a 
separate response to the standing challenge rather than “modify[ing] or supplant[ing] 
[the court’s] holding that STJs were inferior officers based on the ‘significance of 
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[their] duties and discretion.’”142 Thus, the majority viewed the Supreme Court as 
stating that while the final decision-making authority in the first three categories was 
enough to make the STJs inferior officers, final decision-making authority was not 
relied upon for the fourth category.143 Instead, the Supreme Court looked to the 
extent of authority and discretion utilized by the STJ in the fourth category, resting 
its decision on that determination prior to responding to the government’s standing 
challenge.144 This interpretation is aptly summed up by the concurrence’s statement 
that “final decision-making authority might be sufficient to make an employee an 
[o]fficer, [but] that does not mean such authority is necessary for an employee to be 
an [o]fficer.”145
The dissent, unpersuaded, continued to focus on the STJs’ “sovereign power to 
bind the Government and the third parties,” combined with a high level of deference 
afforded to the STJs as the distinguishing factor between Freytag and the present 
case.146 This deference was exemplified by the Tax Court being “required to 
presume correct the [STJ’s] factual findings . . . and to defer to the [STJ’s] 
determinations of credibility.”147 The dissent saw this as “the difference between 
chiseling in stone and drafting in pencil.”148 In support, the dissent noted that the 
factual findings and legal opinions rendered by the STJs were “routinely adopted 
verbatim by the regular Tax Court judges to whom they [were] assigned.”149 In fact, 
of 880 cases assigned to STJs between 1983 and 2015, the Tax Court had purported 
to adopt all 880 of those cases verbatim.150
This was distinguished from the SEC’s ALJs, where the SEC Commission had 
only followed the recommendation of the ALJs in three out of thirteen appeals in 
2016.151 Thus, the dissent viewed “the Commission [as] ‘ultimately control[ling] the 
record for review[ing] and decid[ing] what is on the record,’” because it is the 
Commission that “enters the final order—in all cases—and it is the commissioners 
who shoulder the blame.”152 But the majority found it important that while the SEC 
may have only followed the recommendation of ALJs in three out of thirteen appeals, 
about ninety percent of all ALJ decisions “become final without any review or 
revision from an SEC Commissioner.”153 Indeed, the SEC itself admitted that it 
affords ALJs deference, especially in credibility determinations, and as a result 
engages in “deferential, not de novo review of key aspects of its ALJs’ decisions.”154
The SEC attempted to add a caveat by stating that “[they] do not view the fact 
that we accord Commission ALJs deference in the context of demeanor-based
credibility determinations to afford our ALJs with the type of authority that would 
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qualify them as inferior officers.”155 But, per the concurrence, Bandimere was found 
liable in “no small part on the United States’s assessment of his credibility during 
live testimony, credibility determined by the only government employee designated 
to preside over that testimony—an ALJ.”156 And while the SEC may sometimes 
disagree with credibility determinations, the SEC’s own rules still entitled the “ALJ’s 
evaluation of a witness’s live testimony . . . to ‘considerable weight.’”157
As a final note, the majority concluded with a pointed remark towards a large 
portion of the dissent’s argument: “[E]ven if the STJs exercise more authority than 
the SEC ALJs, it does not follow that the former are inferior officers and the latter 
are employees or that the latter do not exercise significant authority. . . .  SEC ALJs 
can still be inferior officers without possessing identical powers as STJs.” 158 With 
this, the death knell was rung for the SEC’s ALJs; the majority quickly dispatched 
of the SEC’s other arguments.
B.  Deference to Congress
An additional argument put forth by the SEC urged the Tenth Circuit to 
“‘accor[d] significant weight’ to [c]ongressional intent in determining whether the 
ALJs [were] inferior officers.”159 In support, the SEC stressed that “Congress was 
‘deliberate’ in constructing the statutory framework” supporting ALJs, their hiring 
process, and their powers.160 The SEC contended that this suggests the congressional 
intent was for ALJs to be employees.161 The majority quickly dismissed this, stating 
that regardless of how careful Congress may have been in devising its statutory 
scheme, or how effective it may be, it was the court’s place to strike it down if it was 
unconstitutional.162 Regardless, the whole argument was beside the point because as 
a circuit court, the Tenth Circuit was bound to follow Supreme Court precedent, and 
the majority believed such precedent—Freytag—necessitated a result that the SEC’s 
ALJs were inferior officers.163
Further, deference to the workings of the political branches was raised by the 
government in Freytag itself in an attempt at constitutional avoidance, but was 
rejected by the Supreme Court.164 There, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had 
requested that the Supreme Court defer to the Executive Branch’s own view that the 
structural interests at issue were solely those of the Executive Branch, and argued 
that the Supreme Court need not concern itself with the separation of power concerns 
implicated.165 In a stern rebuke, the Supreme Court responded that “the Clause 
forbids Congress to grant the appointment power to inappropriate members of the 
Executive Branch.  Neither Congress nor the Executive can agree to waive this 
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structural protection. . . .  The structural interests protected by the Appointments 
Clause are not those of any one branch of Government but of the entire Republic.”166
The Supreme Court then quickly moved on to the application of the Appointments 
Clause, having easily dispensed with the government’s weak assertion.  The majority 
in Bandimere took a similar approach, summarily rejecting the SEC’s deference to 
Congress argument in favor of honoring Supreme Court precedent.167
The dissent briefly acknowledged this argument by quoting the Supreme Court’s 
statement that “‘we must hesitate to upset the compromises and working 
arrangements that the elected branches of Government themselves have reached,’”168
and then espousing the idea that “[i]n a close case regarding the application of a 
constitutional rule in a discrete factual setting, and without much precedent to guide 
us, deference to Congress seems particularly relevant.”169 But the dissent offered no 
further illumination on its viewpoint, likely due to the weakness of such a position.
C.  “The Probable Consequences of Today’s Decision”
The dissent started its opinion with a dire warning, that this “opinion carries 
repercussions that will throw out of balance the teeter-totter approach to determining 
which of all the federal officials are subject to the Appointments Clause.”170 While 
the dissent did not believe that Freytag “mandate[d] the result . . . here,” it also 
argued that the result reached by the majority was “too troublesome to risk without 
a clear mandate from the Supreme Court.”171 This was based on a fear that every 
federal ALJ could not be declared an inferior officer, which would “effectively 
render[] invalid thousands of administrative actions.”172
The main crux of the dissent’s argument was its view of a lack of explanation 
by the majority on what specific duties were important to the declaration that the 
ALJs exercised enough authority, or how much authority is too much.173 In the end, 
the dissent believed that the majority opinion “left . . . more questions than it 
answer[ed].”174 The dissent exemplified such concerns by comparing the SEC’s 
ALJs with those of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), finding no 
meaningful differences.175 With no such meaningful differences, the dissent worried 
that the SSA would grind to a halt should its ALJs be declared inferior officers in the 
same vein as the SEC’s ALJs.176 In fact, the dissent pointed to an Appointment’s 
Clause challenge to SSA ALJs having already been brought before a court.177
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The majority quickly swept this issue under the rug, acknowledging that its 
decision “potentially implicate[d] other questions,” but cautioning that nothing 
should be “read to answer any but the precise answer before this court: whether SEC 
ALJs are employees or inferior officers.”178 Essentially, the majority believed the 
consequences of the case before them were best left for the future.179
The concurrence attempted to add some clarity, calling the dissent’s predictions 
“exaggerated,”180 as both Freytag and the majority call for a case-by-case 
determination of officer status, and seek to avoid “sweeping pronouncements” as to 
the constitutional status of officers and employees.181 Next, the concurrence rejected 
the dissent’s suggestion that this opinion would lead to the “implosion of the federal 
civil service, at least as to all federal ALJs,” and stated that the dissent “unnecessarily 
sound[ed] the alarm.”182 Specifically, this focused on the argument that without 
being considered employees, ALJs would lose their civil service protection of 
removal for good-cause only. 
This concern stems from Supreme Court precedent that some inferior officers 
are removable only for good-cause, and that double-for-good-cause-removal 
protection is constitutionally forbidden.183 Double-for-good-cause-removal 
protection is created when inferior officer status is layered atop some other good-
cause removal procedures.  Here, the first layer of for-cause protection would be 
created by the ALJ’s current removal procedures—by the Merit Systems Protection 
Board (“MSPB”) for-cause only.184 The dissent believed the second layer would be 
created by the removal procedure of the members of the MSPB—also for-cause 
only.185 The combined layers of protection would insulate ALJs from both direct 
removals by a superior officer or the President, as well as removal by manipulation 
of the MSPB.  The dissent feared that as a result of the majority’s holding, either 
ALJs or the MSPB members would lose their for-cause protection.186
This fear was based on Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, a Supreme Court case in which dual-for-cause removal protection 
for members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) 
violated the Constitution.187 The Supreme Court found that good-cause protection 
was allowable, but no more than one level of protection can “separate[] the President 
from an officer exercising executive authority.”188 Thus, the congressional act that 
authorized the PCAOB violated the Constitution when it both protected members of 
the PCAOB from removal without good cause, and vested the ability to determine 
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good-cause in the SEC’s Commissioners, who may also only be removed for good-
cause.189
The concurrence viewed this as a simple fix, for “[a] court faced with such a 
challenge would be empowered only to order the minimal remedy effective to cure 
the Article II error, rendering the MSPB’s three members removable by the President 
at will.”190 Accordingly, such a result would fix this hypothetical issue without 
changing the protections the ALJ position currently enjoys.191 This is similar to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Free Enterprise Fund.   There, the Court rendered the 
good-cause protection of the PCAOB members invalid, instead allowing them to be 
removed by the SEC Commission at-will.192 As a result, the Board members were 
only separated from the will of the President by one layer of good-cause protection—
that of the SEC Commissioners.193 The concurrence believed a similar result could 
be reached regarding ALJs, should such a challenge be before the court.194
Thus, despite adamant protest from both the SEC and Judge McKay in his 
dissenting opinion, the Tenth Circuit determined that the SEC ALJ who presided 
over the administrative hearing in Bandimere was an inferior officer of the United 
States.195 As a result of this status, the ALJ held his position unconstitutionally, and 
the SEC’s opinion was vacated.196
VIII. ANALYSIS
After the result of Bandimere, a circuit split has been created with regard to the 
proper interpretation of Freytag.  This may seem like an easily fixed issue, but the 
split has potentially huge ramifications.  Should the SEC’s ALJs be definitively 
classified as inferior officers, others who received detrimental rulings by the SEC 
will be provided with a roadmap for challenging those decisions.  With this same 
challenge popping up across the country, it is quite likely that Freytag will continue 
to be scrutinized by the circuits.197
This Note focuses on the narrow issue of the proper interpretation and 
application of Freytag.  In the event that this issue is taken up by the Supreme Court, 
it is likely that Freytag will become the centerpiece of this controversy, and will 
provide a roadmap for other litigants seeking to challenge proceedings before ALJs.  
Thus, this Note provides an analysis of the result compelled by a proper reading of 
Freytag.  Finally, there is a short discussion regarding deference to Congress on this 
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issue, and a short note on the importance of circuit splits in gaining the attention of 
the Supreme Court.
A.  Interpreting Freytag
In Freytag, the Supreme Court identified three indicia of an inferior officer: (1) 
that the position was established by law; (2) that the “duties, salary, and means of 
appointment for that office [were] specified by statute”; and (3) that the purported 
officer performs “more than ministerial tasks” in an “exercise [of] significant 
discretion.”198 When applying this test, the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have 
reached completely opposite results.  For the D.C. Circuit, final-decision making 
power is the level of authority required to be an inferior officer rather than a mere 
employee.199 Anything less results in employee status.  By contrast, the Tenth Circuit 
believes that while final decision-making power is sufficient, it is not necessary to 
be considered an inferior officer.200 Instead, the level of discretion and the 
significance of the potential officer’s duties must be adequately weighed.201
Of these two possible readings, the Tenth Circuit’s is superior.  The D.C. 
Circuit’s reading is in fact a “truncated framework” that improperly reads the “even 
if” standing argument as an addition to the primary holding rather than an alternative
holding.  This reading ignores the clear language of the Supreme Court’s test, and is 
not consistent with the Supreme Court’s actual application of the test in Freytag.
While it is true that the D.C. Circuit has a much larger body of case law 
distinguishing between inferior officers and employees than the Tenth Circuit does, 
that precedent is based on a misapplication of the Freytag test in each successive 
opinion, reading in final decision-making authority as an additional criterion not 
present in Freytag.
In each of its decisions leading up to Lucia in 2016, the D.C. Circuit read the 
“even if” argument in Freytag to be critical to the Supreme Court’s decision.  Such 
a reading ignores the structure of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Freytag.  As put 
forth by the Tenth Circuit in Bandimere, the “even if” argument was not a wholly 
separate holding or an additional criterion.202 Instead, it was a discrete and separate 
response to the government’s argument that the petitioner in Freytag had no standing 
to invoke the inferior officer status of the STJs in the first three categories.203
Had the “even if” argument been a portion of the Supreme Court’s reasoning as 
to the inferior officer status, there would have been no reason for severing it from 
the preceding discussion.  In fact, the Supreme Court had declared that the STJs were 
inferior officers prior to even reaching this discussion.204 The pertinent portion of 
Freytag can be read as two alternative ways to reach the same result.  First, there are 
the three indicia of inferior officer status that the majority used to arrive at its result 
in Bandimere, and second, there is the “even if” argument that can be properly 
delineated by the structure of the Supreme Court’s reasoning.
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In its discussion, the Supreme Court stated that the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue “reason[ed] that special trial judges may be deemed employees in [the 
fourth category of] cases because they lack authority to enter a final decision.”205 In 
response, the Court stated that “this argument ignores the significance of the duties 
and discretion that special trial judges possess.”206 The Court then went on to apply 
what the Tenth Circuit read as the three indicia of inferior officer status. 
In one portion of the Supreme Court’s reasoning, STJs are compared with 
special masters, who are hired by Article III courts.207 The Court distinguished 
between the two by applying the three indicia of officer status, and ended the 
discussion by stating that “[i]n the course of carrying out . . . important functions, 
the special trial judges exercise significant discretion.”208 It is true that the Court 
does not explicitly state that this line of reasoning led to the determination that STJs 
are inferior officers.  But this result is implicit in the reasoning; otherwise, the 
Court’s comparison and all the preceding discussion would be moot. 
After the Court compared the STJs with special masters, it stated that “[e]ven if 
the duties of special trial judges under [the fourth category] were not as significant 
as we and the two courts have found them to be, our conclusion would be 
unchanged.”209 The final clause makes it clear that the Court had decided the STJs 
were already inferior officers based on the significance of their duties and authority; 
otherwise there would be no conclusion to change in the first place.  This is likely 
where the D.C. Circuit’s misinterpretation stems from.
At this point in the Freytag opinion, the Supreme Court was addressing the 
government’s argument that Freytag had no standing “to assert the rights of 
taxpayers whose cases are assigned to special trial judges” under the first three 
categories.210 The ability to assert the rights under the first three categories was 
important, as the government had conceded that the STJs were inferior officers in 
regards to those categories on the basis of final decision-making authority.211 The 
Court dismissed this argument, as STJs “are not inferior officers for purposes of 
some of their duties . . . but mere employees with respect to other responsibilities.”212
Thus, the standing argument was “beside the point,” for “if a special trial judge is an 
inferior officer for purposes of [the first three categories], he is an inferior officer 
within the meaning of the Appointments Clause and he must be properly 
appointed.”213 Such an assertion, on its own, would lead to a completely reasonable 
interpretation that final decision-making authority was what led the Court to declare 
STJs inferior officers.  But this statement cannot be read in a vacuum.  When read in 
conjunction with the entirety of the Court’s reasoning on officer status, it is clear that 
this is somewhat of an alternative argument addressing the absurdities of the 
government’s concession that the STJs are somehow both inferior officers and 
                                                                                                     
205 Id. at 881.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 881-82.
209 Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id.
2017] CREATING MISCHIEF 157
employees.
The Supreme Court rested its decision that the STJs were inferior officers on the 
application of three indicia of officer status, which looked to the exercise of 
significant discretion.  Thus, as stated in Bandimere, final decision-making authority 
may be sufficient to be considered an inferior officer, but that does not in any way 
make it necessary.214
B.  Deference to Congress
Admittedly, the ability to put forth competing readings helps support the 
dissent’s argument, that the status quo should remain in the absence of a clearer 
mandate from the Supreme Court.  In fact, the dissent argues that deference to 
Congress is necessary, because when “faced with such uncertainty, ‘[the Court] must 
hesitate to upset the compromises and working arrangements that the elected 
branches of Government themselves have reached.’”215 But, as noted by Justice 
Scalia in another case, “the political branches cannot by agreement alter the 
constitutional structure.”216
The Supreme Court has consistently read the Appointments Clause not as a mere 
instructive procedure on how to appoint officers, but as a significant safeguard to the 
structure of the Republic.217 And “[n]either Congress nor the Executive can agree to 
waive this structural protection.”218 The Appointments Clause limits the 
dispensation of power by Congress, and limits those that may receive such power.219
This may “not always serve the Executive’s interests,” but it does protect those of 
the entire United States.220
An argument that the current ALJ structure is somehow a threat to the entirety 
of the United States may seem a bit hypocritical, “sounding the alarm” in the exact 
opposite direction from the dissent.  But this argument is not put forth in an attempt 
to claim that the entirety of the administrative law system is unconstitutional, or that 
ALJ position is not extremely useful.  In fact, it is offered for the exact opposite 
reason.  The ALJ position is an extraordinary creation, without which the legal 
system would likely strain to the point of breaking.  Despite this, “the fact that a 
given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions 
of the government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.  
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of a 
democratic government.”221 The potential ease of fixes to the ALJ appointment 
defect makes it all the more important that this issue be solved as quickly as possible 
to maintain a level of confidence and fairness in the administrative law system.
For example, the Appointments Clause clearly states that the power to appoint 
inferior officers may be conferred to the head of an administrative agency.  As the 
SEC is an independent agency, the heads of the agency—the Commissioners—
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would be able to constitutionally appoint ALJs.  Despite this seemingly simple fix, 
commentators have noted that such actions would be seen as an admission by the 
SEC that the current ALJ appointments process is unconstitutional, and potentially 
subject pending and existing SEC orders to new challenges.222 Despite these 
challenges, with the ruling in Bandimere, and the upcoming en banc rehearing in 
Lucia, the SEC will likely be forced to remedy the situation in some manner.
C.  Competing Understandings and the Least Mischief
The Bandimere dissent began by stating, in the absence of a clear mandate from 
the Supreme Court, that it “would prefer the outcome that does the least mischief.”223
In effect, this would avoid the creation of a circuit split on this important issue.  But 
the presence of a circuit split is one of the most, if not the most, important factors 
that the Supreme Court considers when deciding whether or not to grant certiorari.224
In fact, a study of certiorari petitions from 2003 to 2005 showed that of those granted 
by the Supreme Court, cases involving a conflict of opinion in lower courts ranged 
from 58.4 percent to 78.9 percent of those in which certiorari was granted.225 Thus, 
avoiding “mischief” would seem to be a poor judicial philosophy when a particularly 
important issue is at hand.  This is especially true when the most applicable Supreme 
Court precedent can arguably be read in two separate manners, even if one reading 
is clearly more faithful to the actual text of the opinion.
Had Judge McKay’s dissenting preference prevailed, an intra-circuit split would 
have been created rather than an inter-circuit split.  But intra-circuit splits do not 
create the same probability of certiorari being granted.  Instead, the Supreme Court 
prefers to leave intra-circuit disputes to be resolved from within, as “[i]t is primarily 
the task of a Court of Appeals to reconcile its internal difficulties.”226
While it is true that the existence of a circuit split might be the most important 
factor in determining whether certiorari may be granted, it is far from the only factor.  
The Supreme Court also considers cases where lower courts have “decided an 
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by [the 
Supreme Court], or has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts 
with relevant decisions of [the Supreme Court].”227 It is hard to imagine that a 
decision declaring that administrative law judges require constitutional appointment 
would not be such an important federal question.  Thus, while the existence of a 
circuit split may be sufficient to catch the attention of the Supreme Court, it is far 
from necessary.  Regardless, higher odds of review are never a poor idea.  
In an ideal future, the Supreme Court will take up this issue, and provide a clear 
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mandate that allows agencies to determine whether the agencies’ ALJs are exercising 
too much power, and if so, to appoint them in a manner that comports with the 
Constitution.228 Even if the impending rehearing by the D.C. Circuit, and possible 
review by the Tenth Circuit, results in the circuit split dissolving, the question of the 
constitutionality of ALJs in other agencies will not simply vanish.  The SEC may 
remedy the manner in which it appoints ALJs, but as pointed out by the dissent in 
Bandimere, other agencies use ALJs in a significantly similar manner.229 But at least 
for the case at hand, the Tenth Circuit has taken the correct first step by putting the 
SEC on notice that it is using its ALJs in a manner that does not comport with the 
requirements of the Constitution.  
IX. CONCLUSION
Hopefully, the result in Bandimere will begin forcing the SEC to reconsider the 
constitutionality of its ALJ appointment process.  The administrative law system is 
expansive, and in effect, encompasses the powers of all three branches of 
government.230 While the ALJ position may be an amazing creation of American 
law that allows the United States to function smoothly in an age of constant litigation, 
the ALJs are not immune from the checks and balances embedded in the 
Constitution.
Ultimately, a fix is unlikely to significantly alter the functioning of the 
administrative law system, as demonstrated by the SEC Commissioners simply 
appointing their own ALJs.  While that fix may potentially implicate many other 
SEC decisions and orders, and is the type of mischief the dissent in Bandimere
advocated against, the status quo cannot be maintained if it is unconstitutional.  It 
has been noted by another commentator that this argument values form over function, 
but “[d]istrupting a system that is largely working should factor into the solution,” 
not determine the constitutionality of that system.231
It is true that whatever the solution, many SEC decisions will likely be called 
into question.  Perhaps the SEC should have begun to consider such a possibility 
when the constitutionality of its ALJs was first called into question in 2015.232
Instead, the SEC chose to ignore the warning signs, likely bolstered by the friendly 
result in Lucia. But the SEC cannot continue to ignore this issue or kick the can 
down the road.  The SEC, and any other agencies utilizing a similar approach to 
appointing ALJs, must accept the repercussions of its actions and attempt to move 
forward.  While other approaches to fixing the unconstitutionality of the current ALJ 
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appointments process have been put forth,233 the simplicity of having the agency 
head appoint the agency’s own inferior officers makes the most sense, and would be 
the easiest to put into practice.  But, regardless of the approach taken to remedy this 
situation, the Tenth Circuit was correct in Bandimere to uphold the structure the 
Constitution put in place.
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